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Dianne Pothier* Miles To Go:
Some Personal Reflections on
the Social Construction of
Disability
The most serious barriers facing any individual with a disability are
socially constructed and are not inherent in the "handicap" itself.
David M. Engel & Alfred S. Konefsky "Law Students with Disabilities:
Removing Barriers ir the Law School Community"'
The greatest handicap I face as a visually disabled person is not the
physical limitations occasioned by the poor eyesight, but rather the
attitude of others toward my disability. The label "physically challenged"
obscures the reality of the social construction of disability.
The "social construction" of disability refers to the way an able bodied
conception of disability magnifies its consequences. The social construc-
tion of disability assesses and deals with disability from an able bodied
perspective. It includes erroneous assumptions about capacity to perform
that come from an able bodied frame of reference. It encompasses the
failure to make possible or accept different ways of doing things. It
reflects a preoccupation with "normalcy" that excludes the disabled
person.
A concept like the social construction of disability is not easily
understood in the abstract. Where attitudes are deeply ingrained and
operate mostly at a semi-conscious level, a very hard-nosed look at reality
is necessary to understand the phenomenon. This article attempts to shed
some light on the social construction of disability by recounting and
sharing personal experiences.
The reliance on personal experiences is a way of providing concrete
illustrations. I have made a deliberate choice to use as examples things
that have happened to me personally. This is not because my experiences
are unique or especially compelling. Quite the contrary, the premise that
lies behind this discussion is that these experiences are representative of
*I would like to thank Patricia (Trish) Monture who, as a friend and colleague, and through her
writings, helped me to find the strength to let my voice be heard. I would also like to thank the
many friends, colleagues, and family members, too numerous to mention, for their helpful
comments.
1. (1990), 38 Buffalo L.R. 551, at 567. The same point is made by David Lepofsky in
"Disabled Persons in Canadian Law Schools", delivered to the Canadian Council of Law
Deans on November 8, 1990, at 3.
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a widespread phenomenon. While I feel at liberty to use my own
experiences, I do not think I have the right, in the words of Patricia
Monture, to appropriate other peoples' pain.2
The personal experiences to which I will be referring relate to my
connections with Dalhousie Law School, as a student, ajob applicant, and
a faculty member. My story concerns Dalhousie Law School only
because that happens to be where Ihave spent most of the last dozen years
of my life. I consider the story to be worth telling, not because Dalhousie
is particularly notorious,3 but because I am convinced my experiences at
Dalhousie are quite typical.
Speaking out on issues of disability is a relatively new venture for me.
For most of my life I have suffered silently. If one complains, one is likely
to alienate people and it has not been my style to consciously alienate
people. I also think my passive response was, in effect, a strategy
designed (unconsciously) to make my disability as invisible as possible.
But I no longer wish to do that. Patricia Monture's discussion of racism
is something with which I find strong parallels in terms of disability.
What I attempt to do is to re-claim racism, as a word, and as a concept, and
as an experience. I want it to speak to me, of me, for me. I am tired of it
defining someone else's experience who has the luxury of not living
racism. Racism, both as a concept and as an experience, creates a subject
outside of me and leaves me being object. The fact is that racism creates
an unnatural inversion. It is therefore a neat little trick which further
oppresses the individual or collective that is struggling to overcome their
oppression. This is the neat little trick. As soon as I point out to most
people, "HEY, that's racist", it is distancing. You become defensive. You
blame me for calling you names. Ifeel guilty as I had never intended to hurt
you. That is not my way. I have the responsibility to be kind. Kindness is
one of my original responsibilities. The power to define my own experi-
ence is then taken away from me because racism is a bad word!
Racism is turned against the 'victim' in this kind of a labelling process.'
That phenomenon has a powerful effect of silencing. Saying nothing
in reaction to hurtful things related to my disability seemed to be the
2. Patricia Monture, "Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah", (1988), 2 C.J.W.L. 159,
at 163, 167.
3. Dalhousie Law School has in fact made a point of addressing issues of discrimination,
especially in relation to gender and race. The affirmative action hiring policy has been taken
very seriously in the Law School, such that the gender balance on faculty has changed
dramatically in the last dozen years. The Indigenous Blackand Mi'kmaqProgram is attempting
to overcome the gross under-representation of Nova Scotia Blacks and Mi'kmaqs in the legal
profession. Action on the disability front, however, has been less concerted.
4. Patricia Monture, "Reflecting on Flint Woman", in R. Devlin (ed.), Canadian Perspectives
on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1991) 351, at 359-60.
528 The Dalhousie Law Journal
"polite" thing to do, and the path of least resistance. But the path of least
resistance is also the path of no accomplishment. If the social construction
of disability goes unchallenged and the disabled perspective never gets
articulated, there is no reason to expect any changes in offensive behav-
iour and attitudes. Able bodied stereotypes of disability wilt continue to
be perpetuated unless there is an effort to expose them. By using my
reflections on my personal experiences as a means of conveying a
message that has more general application, I hope to make at least a small
impression in the mortar of the social construction of disability.
I need to explain the nature of my disability to give the context for my
discussion. People often seem quite reluctant to ask about my eyesight,
but in fact I do not at all mind talking about it. The only thing that offends
me is the hesitation about asking, because it seems to indicate that my
poor eyesight is something about which I should be ashamed. This is but
a further reflection of the social construction of disability.
The specifics of my eyesight are as follows. Using a regular eye chart,
my left eye tests at 20/300, and my right eye tests at 20/200, in other
words, what a normal eye can see at 300 feet, my left eye can see at 20 feet
and what a normal eye can see at 200 feet, my right eye can see at 20 feet.
The standard definition of blindness is 20/200 in the poorer eye, which I
fit on the basis of the regular eye chart. However, using low vision charts
(which have a 10 foot rather than a 20 foot base, and are more accurate
in the low vision range), my better right eye tests at about 10/80, in other
words, not quite blind.
The effect of my eyesight on my daily life is, for me, not that big a deal.
I can't drive a car, or even generally recognize people in a car. People
sometimes think I am being a snob when I do not acknowledge their
greeting from a passing car when I am walking. What they do not realize
is that, not only can I not see their gesture or recognize who they are, but
also in most cases it is only on faith that I assume there is in fact a person
driving the car. If I were judging solely by what I see, I would have to
seriously consider the theory that most cars drive themselves!
I do not see well enough for glasses to be of any real use to me. My poor
eyesight is not the usual difficulty with focus that can be corrected; rather,
the essential problem is that a substantial number of the cones in my eyes
do not work. What I really need is magnification, not a focus correction.
Where appropriate, I use seven power (pocket size) binoculars, a four
power monocle, or an twenty dioptre magnifying glass. With all of these
devices, the fieldof vision is very narrow, so ifI can get by, I use nothing.
My usual reading posture is with my nose almost touching the page; I
have to physically move my head from side to side to be able to read the
full line of text.
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All of this is second nature to me; I have been doing it all my life. From
my perspective, what ultimately matters is that I can do most of the things
I want to do in spite of my poof eyesight. We all have various degrees of
ability to do a wide range of things. Although I do not see as well as most
people, there are lots of things that I can do just as well as, if not better
than, most people. We all learn to adapt our lives to the capabilities that
we have. Yet my poor eyesight tends to be accorded a special signifi-
cance.
My poor eyesight is part of the fact that I am an albino. That is an
inherited condition (through recessive genes) which involves a lack of
pigmentation. It means I have (and have had since birth) fair skin and
white hair, which are the telltale signs of lousy eyesight. The association
of my poor eyesight with albinism means that I am not in a position to
really hide my disability.5 It also means that, in addition to the reaction to
the fact of my poor eyesight, I also have to cope with the reaction of the
fact of my different physical appearance. Overt reactions to the albinism
as such are relatively rare in my experience, and are not actually any part
of my experiences at Dalhousie.6 However, I suspect that the reaction to
the albinism contributes to the reaction to the eyesight. Overt manifesta-
tions of negative reaction to the eyesight are also relatively infrequent
(and sometimes a reaction may be vague enough that it is difficult to tell
whether the eyesight is a factor), bu't I have no doubt that they represent
a much more widespread unstated reaction.
In assessing how people respond to my eyesight, it is not their intent
that is necessarily the problem; they may in fact be acting with the best
5. Engel and Konefsky, supra, note 1, point out that many students with an "invisible"
disability go to great lengths to hide the fact of their disability, a reflection of how high the
socially constructed costs of disability can be.
6. Overt reactions to the albinism are still something I have not figured out an effective strategy
fordealing with. When walking down the street, minding my own business, I do not know how
to respond to someone who says to their friend: "look there's an albino" and starts to laugh. My
reaction to such situations is to try to hide the pain and pretend that I do not hear, although in
truth my hearing is quite good, and a significant part of how I cope with poor eyesight.
Nor is this simply a function of a few rude, nameless people. One of the most disturbing
pieces of literature I have ever read is a short story by Audrey Thomas, whom I otherwise
admire as a writer. The story "Omo" in the collection Two in the Bush and Other Stories
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1981), pp. 19-47 is about a very sinister and evil character;
the overwhelming impression I got in reading the story was - what else would you expect; he's
an albino?
I have not seen, nor do I wish to see, a movie reputed to be one of the 10 worst movies ever
made. Right up there with "I Saved Hitler's Brain" and "The Attack of the Killer Tomatoes"
is a movie, the name of which I do not recall, featuring an all albino cast. (I refuse to put any
effort into finding out the name; that effort would give the film a degree of legitimacy' I do not
wish to accord it.) I do not need to know anything more about this film to realize that it exploits
the perceived "freak" status of albinos.
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of (though in my assessment misguided) intentions. What ultimately
matters is the effect of what is happening, and the ultimate message of
marginalization that is conveyed about disability. My experiences em-
phasize the importance of the legal position, under both human rights
legislation7 and s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8
that intent (whether malicious or not) is not a requisite element of
discrimination. It is important to emphasize this point because many of
the events I will be discussing involve people whom I consider to be my
friends.
The following accounts of several incidents I faced as a student, a job
applicant, and a faculty member revolve around variations on a common
theme: the difficulties that able bodied persons have in coping with the
different ways that a disabled person has of doing things.
I. The syndrome of.- 'your discomfort with my difference becomes my
problem'
As a student at Dalhousie Law School from 1979 to 1982, my eyesight
was not, as far as I was concerned, a significant factor. There were minor
irritations involving problems in reading the board or in reading notices;
these kinds of things were minor because I had gotten so used to them. (I
did not at that time have the monocle that has now largely solved those
sorts of problems.) I also had more problems than most students in coping
with poor quality reproductions in some casebooks. But I never made a
real issue about these sorts of things. 9 However, there was one incident
in my third year in which it became starkly clear that my poor eyesight
was a significant factor to others. This incident is my most vivid memory
of my three years as a law student.
The incident in question involved a mooting exercise in which I was
making oral submissions. As was typical for this course, the person
hearing the submissions was a prominent lawyer from outside the Law
School, in this case a sitting judge (since deceased). Because I was being
evaluated for my performance, by both the judge and the course profes-
sor, the nature of the reaction to my eyesight was quite explicit. As far as
I can tell, that is the only part of this incident that is out of the ordinary.
7. Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561; O'Malley v. Simpson's-
Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
8. Law Society of British Columbia et al. v. Andrews et al., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
9. As a faculty member, I now find that I do raise an issue when I notice other faculty members
not being sensitive to students who cannot see the board, etc. This is in part because I have
become more militant, and in part because I still find it easier to complain on someone else's
behalf, rather than my own.
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During my presentation, which was made from a seated position (as
was everyone else's), I was relying very heavily on notes. For me to do
that (especially given the optical devices available to me at the time)
meant lowering my head almost to the table to look at my notes, and then
raising my head to speak. (It may be that I did not always wait until my
head was backup before speaking, such that some of what I said may have
been difficult to hear.) In other words, my head was bobbing up and down
throughout the presentation.
At the end of our presentations the judge gave us general feedback. I
remember my reaction to what he said more clearly than what he actually
said; if anything, my reconstruction of the event is more charitable to him
than the event itself. I should also note that there was not the slightest
doubt that his remarks were directed at my eyesight. His comments were
to the effect that my strengths lay in research. Although he probably
meant it to be a compliment, the very clear message that came through to
me was that I should not be seen in public. Although I was extremely upset
by the remark, I was "too polite" to say anything. Furthermore, I did not
have enough confidence to confront him. Neither the professor nor any
of the other students said anything either. It was clear from conversations
I had with some of the people after the event that their reason for silence
was neither politeness or deference, but simply that they had not noticed
anything particularly wrong with what he had said. It made the point that
thejudge's reaction was not an aberration, but very typical.10 That is what
gives this incident its real significance.
The same basic attitude was also present in the way the professor
evaluated my performance, although he reached a different conclusion,
that I should change the manner of my presentation. In some respects, the
way the professor reacted was one of the best things anyone has ever told
me, but in other respects, it was one of the most blatantly discriminatory
things that has ever happened to me. The positive part of the professor's
reaction was that he came down very hard on me for relying so heavily
on notes. He knew that I "knew my stuff', and did not need to be relying
on notes in the way that I had been. He helped build my confidence to
realize that I could give a presentation without relying much, or at all, on
notes. That is in fact something I can do without too much difficulty, since
I have a good memory. The negative side of the professor's reaction,
however, was how far he took the point. Although he gave me a
(generous) mark of 9/10 for the substance of my presentation, he gave me
10. Comments made during my time as a legal counsel to the Canada Labour Relations Board
regarding my experience as an appellate advdcate also reinforced the conclusion that this was
a typical reaction.
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a failing grade of 4/10 for the style of my presentation. The overall mark
for the course was very high, such that the failing mark on the presentation
has never come back to haunt me as part of a transcript, but it was the
message conveyed to me personally by that failing grade that was of
importance.
Although I raised some questions with the professor at the time about
the account (not) being taken of my disability, I did not unequivocally
challenge the standards of evaluation being used. I was not then able to
fully articulate the issue as one of a social construction of disability, and
so the professor did not respond in those terms. Whereas part of me
thought there was a serious problem typified by both the judge's and the
professor's reaction to my presentation, another part of me wondered. If
I were the only one who saw a problem, maybe there was-none. And since,
as far as I knew, there were no other significantly disabled students at the
Law School, nor any disabled faculty members, there was no one I could
look to for reinforcement. The social construction of disability is so
powerful that it begins to convince the disabled themselves that one is
inferior if not "normal". It took a long time before I fully appreciated the
nature of that phenomenon. For reasons Iam about to explain, I now have
no doubt that there was a problem in how my performance was evaluated.
The fact that others did not recognize the problem was not an indication
of no problem, but rather a reflection of just how deep seated the problem
was and is.
I do not pretend that my presentation was a very good one in terms of
style - I was clearly relying too heavily on notes for it to be a strong
presentation. And if there were some difficulty in hearing me at times,
that obviously detracts from its effectiveness. Furthermore, the way I said
things may not have been the most convincing. All of those sorts of
criticisms I can readily accept. But what is worth noting is what made the
difference between a poor performance and a failing one. What is
problematic from my perspective was the fact that my performance was
judged as grossly substandard because I was being assessed on an able
bodied standard. Let me elaborate.
Verbatim reading of material is generally heavily frowned upon
(although it is quite standard at academic conferences). Significant
reliance on notes is, however, widely accepted as long as it is not
excessive. I was excessively relying onnotes, and was justly criticized for
that. But the criticism was magnified because of the way I am forced to
rely on notes, as a consequence of the fact that I read an inch or two from
the page instead of a foot or two from the page. What an able bodied
person can do thatI cannot do is make a subtle shiftbetween looking down
at my notes and looking up at those to whom I am speaking. When
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normally sighted people rely excessively on notes, (as opposed to actual
reading of text) it is considered a minor difficulty. When I do it, which
entails sticking my nose almost on the page, it is considered an abysmal
performance. When I rely heavily on notes, it is very obvious that I am
doing it, but it is not hard to tell when normally sighted people are doing
it - even I can see (and hear) that in a presentation. So why is it such a
problem when I do it? I think it is clear that expectations of an oral
presentation are based on the way able bodied people perform, and when
a disabled person does not conform, that is considered distracting. (It was
so distracting from the judge's perspective that he thought people should
not be exposed to it at all.) I think this is symptomatic of a general
discomfort of able bodied people with the different ways that disabled
people have of doing things. Although some differences are readily
accepted, many are not.
In recent conversations with the professor in question, he has raised the
dilemma of how one deals with a student who does things in a way that
others, however unfairly, will judge substandard in the real life of
lawyering; his point is that this is a reality that must be confronted. There
certainly is something to this point. But it is one thing to have a frank
discussion about how a particular behaviour will be perceived and what
one wants to do about that. It is quite another to give a failing mark that
says, in effect, this is the way life is, and there's no problem with it.
I think there is a clear analogy to issues of gender. The professor would
never have dared to say that he was giving me a lower mark because I am
a woman, and this area of law was one in which it would be difficult for
a woman to break into. The professor would have recognized such a
comment as blatantly sexist, even though it was quite true that this area
of law was quite male dominated and oriented. He would have recognized
this was not a problem that reflected on my capacities as a lawyer, but as
a systemic problem about sexism in the legal profession that had to be
confronted. The fact that my disability was not analysed within the same
framework is an indication of just how far there is to go in tackling the
social construction of disability.
Many may contest the analogy just drawn, largely because of a
distinction between what one is (which is accepted as an invalid basis for
judging performance) and what one does (which is assumed to be a valid
basis for assessment). To me, this is a false dichotomy." In many ways,
11. At a recent seminar that I gave, this was accepted up to a point by the professor in question.
As an example, he suggested that standards should be adjusted to take account of the fact that
women tend to have softer voices; i.e. that it could be acceptable to have submissions made a
shorter distance away or with the use of a microphone.
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what you do is intimately connected to what you are. It is not enough to
simply have an official policy that all are welcome. The more pervasive
question is whether people are, nonetheless, expected to act like men, like
whites, like heterosexuals, like middle class, and/or like able bodied
people. If people are expected to act as something they are not, they are
either doomed to failure or are robbed of part of their identity.
"Objective" standards of performance need to recognize and accept
that there are different ways of doing things, none of which is inherently
the best way. Translated into legalese, it is not a "bonafide occupational
requirement" or a "bonafidejusfification" to say that this is the way it has
always been done, or the way most people do it.
If perceived problems in the performance of a disabled person are
really simply a reaffirmation of the way able bodied people usually do
things, the standard of assessment needs to be re-evaluated. In my
experience there is a long way to go in avoiding the expectation that, in
many contexts, disabled people must act like able bodied people in order
to be accepted.
Against this background, I have faced what are, for me, problematic
choices in how to deal with the reality of how I know people will generally
react to me in oral presentations. One strategy is to avoid the issue by
simply never giving oral presentations; in choosing to become a teacher,
I have obviously rejected that strategy. The strategy I have adopted is,
generally, not to rely much, or at all, on my written notes, but to rely on
my memory instead. I have struggled with the question of whether this is
a cop out, whether it is simply caving in to the pressures to act as if I were
not disabled. I have tried to convince myself (with considerable, but not
complete, success) that it is not a cop out because it is a better presenta-
tion, even for an able bodied person, to do it without looking at notes. It
is generally easier to hold interest when the speaker's mind is currently
engaged rather than regurgitating a prepackaged product. But although it
is generally better for anyone to give a presentation without looking at
notes, the point still remains that there is a greater premium on my doing
this than is the case for most people. There is a double standard at work.
When I now get compliments after giving a lengthy presentation without
looking at a single note, I often do not react very well to the compliment.
It is not that the particular person offering the compliment is offensive,
it is the entire context in which the comment is made that I find troubling.
The plain truth is that, to a significant extent, I speak without reliance on
notes because I have to. I do it because itrelieves others of the discomfort
of having to confront my disability, discomfort that would likely translate
into a negative assessment of me. People are slow to recognize that there
are more ways than the able bodied ways of doing things, that the able
bodied way is not the "best" way.
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I. The syndrome of: 'assessing the ability of the disabled from an
able bodied frame of reference'
The above discussion starts to make the point that the social construction
of disability assumes inability to perform far beyond the real physical
limitations imposed by the disability. The refusal to accept different ways
of doing things as adequate is one level at which this takes place. The
effect on the disabled person can be even more profound where there is
a failure to acknowledge even the possibility of a different way of doing
things.
I make this point based on my general observations of how able bodied
people often assess the capabilities of disabled people. There is a
tendency to assume there is only one way to do things, but even where the
analysis progresses beyond that, the assessment is still stacked against the
disabled person. It is an easy trap for able bodied persons (subcon-
sciously) to look at the situation from the perspective of how they would
cope if suddenly afflicted with that disability. More specifically, the
attitude often seems to be: "how would I cope in the first five minutes if
I were suddenly afflicted with that disability?". If the question is posed
in that way, the answer is almost invariably: "I wouldn't cope very well
at all". If this kind of approach is transposed onto the disabled person, the
disabled person is doomed from the start. What this fails to recognize is
that disabled people learn to cope with their disability. They develop
skills of doing things in a different way. They develop skills that able
bodied people are never required to develop. They rely on other senses to
compensate for the weakness in one sense, etc., etc. In my case, my
hearing is quite good, so that I depend on oral cues, andIrely substantially
on voice'identification. (When working for a summer in a credit office,
I once cashed a cheque without asking for identification on the basis that
I recognized the voice of a local radio personality, although I did not have
the faintest idea what he looked like.) As noted above, my good memory
also helps me compensate for my poor vision. And although most people
find it hard to imagine having to read the way that I do, for me, the way
that I read is quite natural and easy. Again, this all comes back to the point
that there is more than the able bodied way of doing things.
There certainly are limits. There are things that are rendered either
impossible or highly dangerous because of a disability. I would not want
to be in or near a car that I was driving. But it is all to easy to exaggerate
the limits. In the context of visual impairment, the fact that people find
reliance on their sight useful does not make it essential. Itis also important
to realize that technology advances can make possible things that were
previously impossible. Assumptions of inability can be based on reality,
but they can also be purely a social construction.
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In a minor way, the relevance of this point came home to me directly
during the interview process the first time (in 1985) 1 applied to teach at
Dalhousie Law School. I do not attribute the fact that I did not get the job
-on this occasion to the incident I am about to relate) I was in fact not all
that upset that I did not get the job. (It is worth noting that, in contrast, the
professor who gave me the failing grade on the presentation seemed to be
quite perturbed by the fact that I had not gotten the job.) Had I known that
I would get the job a year later, I would not even have applied the first
time. But all of that is really beside the point.
The incident in question arose during the series of interviews with
individual faculty members. Because I was a former student, I already
knew most of the faculty members, which made it easier for conversa-
tions to be quite direct. In one of the interviews my eyesight came up in
the conversation in a way that I did not find particularly tactful, but that
one I simply put down to sheer tactlessness. More significant was a
conversation with another faculty member who directly asked how I
would compensate for my poor eyesight in my teaching style. Although
I was a bit taken aback that an explanation was necessary, it was a
perfectly legitimate question, and I had no trouble in answering it. I am
not offended by someone who is curious about how I compensate for my
poor vision where the assumption is made that accommodation is indeed
possible. But it was his reason for asking the question that was problem-
atic. He said he was asking because he wanted to be able to pass on the
information in response to a conversation in the faculty lounge in which
two unnamed colleagues had raised some objection to my appointment on
the basis of my eyesight. At least as related to me, this conversation did
not reflect a curiosity about how I would compensate, but an assumption
that it could not be done. There is a world of difference between the two.
The faculty member describing the conversation went on to say that he
thought that my eyesight was not the real basis for the objection, but that
he wanted to be able to respond to the stated basis for the objection in any
event.
I did not press for any details about this conversation. Nor did I say
anything to indicate how offensive I found this conversation, though I
preferred to know about it rather than have it hidden. But as far as I am
concerned, the one factor that was not relevant to my suitability for the
12. I do not have any concrete basis upon which to conclude that my disability has ever caused
me to be denied a job. However, there are circumstances that make one wonder. When a
rejection comes with indecent haste following an interview, giving as the reason my areas of
interest (which were quite apparent from my curriculum vitae, and thus obvious without an
interview), I can only wonder about the relevance of my disability, which would nothave been
evident without the interview.
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job was my eyesight. The conversation was offensive whether or not my
eyesight was the real basis for the objection. It has occurred to me that this
element of the story may have been included to try to make the conver-
sation sound less offensive. If so, that did not work. If anything, it made
it more offensive. For even if the eyesight comment were masking
something else, it meant that the individuals involved thought it was safe
to object to me on the basis of my eyesight, but not safe to object to me
on the basis of something else. That speaks volumes in terms of how
vision disabilities are assessed, and shows how far there is to go.
Although racism and sexism have certainly not been eradicated, by the
time of my interview people had realized that you are not supposed to say
that someone should not be hired because of being a woman or a Black.
Yet there were, apparently, some who had not figured out that you are not
supposed to say that someone should not be hired because she is disabled.
III. The syndrome of 'we'll accommodate your disability by imposing
an undue burden on someone else'
As a faculty member, I have run into some instances of overt negative
reactions to my different ways of doing things, 3 but the more noteworthy
issues relate to the manner in which my disability is accommodated, in the
few circumstances where some particular accommodation is necessary.
There are two incidents worth mentioning, both relating to the issue of
how the costs of accommodating disability are distributed. That the issues
have reached that stage is a sign of progress, because the need for
accommodation is not itself being questioned.
There is time and effort associated with tackling discrimination and
inequality and, particularly in the context of disability, there are often
specific costs associated with accommodating the disability. A commit-
ment to equality necessarily entails accepting those costs. While doing
nothing places an undue burden on the victim of discrimination, care must
13. In class, when I want to read out a short passage from the coursebook or a statute, etc., I
use a four power monocle which enables me to read without my voice getting lost in the page.
In the first or second class, I explain to the students what the monocle is, and what I use it for,
as part ofa general explanation of how my eyesight affects my teaching. I generally try to make
a joke about the monocle to try to relieve any unease students may feel about it. But on two
occasions, students started laughing at the monocle before I got to thejoke. In neither case did
I say anything which displayed the fact thatI was offended. With 20/20 hindsight (the only kind
pf 20/20 vision I can ever purport to have), I should have said something to indicate why I
considered the laughter inappropriate.
Also during the explanation of the effect of my eyesight on my teaching, I ask students in
large classes to come to me outside of class to introduce themselves. I explain that I have trouble
matching up pictures with distant faces, especially when the pictures are a year or two old.
Although some students accede to my request, most do not. My request is out of the ordinary;
it is not something they would expect to do with their able bodied professors.
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be taken that in remedying the discrimination no undue burden is placed
on others. Discrimination is a systemic problem; the responsibility and
costs of remedying it must be spread systemically.
In one particular incident I considered that the suggested cure was
worse than the disease because of the failure to recognize this point. This
incident also has an element of able bodied people acting unilaterally, and
not letting the disabled person define her own needs. The factual context
is a bit complex, having to do with the physical attributes of particular
rooms at Dalhousie Law School. Since the start of my teaching career at
Dalhousie, there had been one seminar room that I, most of my col-
leagues, and most students, hated as a classroom. Room 205 had never
been designed as a classroom; when I was a student it was part of the print
shop. It was too small to be anything but a seminar room, but it was too
long and narrow to be an effective seminar room. Furthermore, there was
only a single row of overhead lights, which made the lighting poor; the
room's use as a seminar room effectively removed any opportunity of
using table lamps to compensate. Accordingly, although the room could
be made more or less adequate for other purposes,14 there really was
nothing that could be done to make the room a good teaching room. In
contrast, room 305, another seminar room, was considered by everyone
to be one of the best teaching rooms in the school.
I have trouble seeing students at the best of times, and it was particu-
larly hard for me in room 205. Fortunately, the only times I taught in that
room were in the second term of a full year course; the fact that I already
knew the students made it a bit easier to cope with the room. However,
I never asked to be exempted from room 205 because it did not seem to
me that I had any more right than anyone else to avoid an inadequate
room. I, like everyone else, had to grin and bear it.
In the renovations that followed the 1985 Dalhousie Library fire, room
205 was, much to everyone's satisfaction, slated to disappear. In the term
from January to April, 1989, and during the summer of 1989 there had to
be temporary room allocations as we worked around the construction.
During the summer, room 305 was slated to.be the temporary admissions
office. The Law School administration decided, without any discussion
with faculty in general, to use room 305 as the admissions office for the
January to April term as well, thereby removing one of the best teaching
rooms and leaving in place the worst teaching room. Those of us who
were teaching in room 205 that term were, to put it mildly, not amused.
When the issue was brought before faculty council I was one of several
who objected to the room allocation, adding that I found it particularly
14. There were, however, some different opinions about that among the support staff.
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difficult to teach in that room because of my eyesight. Although I did not
explain it in these terms, I included the comment not as a plea for special
treatment, but because my experience seemed to bring into sharper focus
the general problem. I happened to be sitting next to the Dean, and I could
tell that my comment had made an impression on him. But there was no
further consultation with me. The next thing I knew about it was when I
got a telephone call from a colleague saying that, although it was not yet
clear whether the admissions office would shift from 305 to 205 for the
term, the administration had decided that she and I would switch rooms,
that she would teach in 205 and I would teach in another seminar room
that she had originally been assigned. This colleague did not appear
thrilled at the prospect of the switch, but she was prepared to go along.
15
She seemed quite shocked when I said I was not prepared to go along.
When I put this position to people in the Law School administration, they
found it hard to believe that I was serious, and that I was notjust using this
as a tactic to try to get the general switch. I was indeed quite serious that
I would not accept a switch that would be made just for me. (My resolve
on this point was never tested, since the general switch was ultimately
made.) As far as I was concerned there was a general problem, and the
only acceptable solution was a general solution. To make the specific
switch just for me would have been to ignore the.general problem and
make this other faculty member and her students suffer because of my
sight disability. That is both unfair to them and unfair to me, because that
kind of solution will ultimately create a backlash against me.
There are questions of degree here. Accommodating disability often
does have effects on others which must be accepted as part of achieving
equality. Human rights jurisprudence recognizes the necessity of accom-
modation, but only up to the point of undue hardship. 6 I see the defence
of undue hardship not as just an out for respondents, but as a safeguard
to protect the credibility of the fight against discrimination. In an equity
context, how could one defend the imposition of undue hardship?
In the context of the incident just described, I drew the line at the point
where the room was basically inadequate as a teaching room. Where there
are degrees of adequacy I do not have any difficulty in asking for and
accepting preference for the room most conducive to my eyesight. The
15. My reading of the conversation at the time was that she was reluctantly agreeing. Two
years later, her recollection was that she would happily have made the switch. That difference
does have some effect on how I assess the situation, but does not change the fundamental point
made below.
16. O'Malley, supra, note 7; Alberta (Human Rights Commission) v. Central Alberta Dairy
Pool, [1990) 2 S.C.R. 489.
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issue becomes especially simple when, as has happened, I particularly
like a room because of my eyesight, and a colleague who teaches at the
same time actively dislikes the same room for another reason. I do,
however, have difficulty asking for and accepting preference in avoiding
a generally inadequate room. Although there is obviously plenty of scope
for debate as to what constitutes undue hardship, it is ultimately not in the
interests of those sought to be protected by human rights legislation to try
to promote accommodation past the point of undue hardship. That can
only produce a situation of one step forward, two steps back, if.more
resentment than understanding is produced.
The degree of impact upon others is also relevant to the last incident
of my story. In many respects this last incident is the light at the end of
the tunnel, because it does acknowledge that equality requires taking
account of difference in a way that ultimately overcomes the effect of
difference. Yet there is still an element of not sufficiently spreading the
burden of the cost of accommodating disability.
I am composing this article on a computer. It took considerable time
to work out the kind of computer set-up that would adequately serve my
needs. Although "in a pinch" I can function with my nose almost touching
a standard monitor (and there are circumstances where I have no other
option), that is far from generally adequate. What is basically adequate
(despite a few quirks) is to use a 21 inch television as my monitor,
working in 40 character mode rather than the regular 80 character mode.
This arrangement also requires an unusual kind of computer card.
Although this set-up turned out to be considerably less expensive than
some of the options I had considered, it was still several hundred dollars
more expensive than a normal computer.
Dalhousie does not cover the cost of computer acquisitions by its
faculty, and I thus made no claim for the basic cost of the computer.
However, I did invoke the university's employment equity policy to
claim the extra costs I incurred in order to accommodate my sight
disability. The university readily agreed; it probably helped that the Dean
of the Law School was, at the time, the co-chair of a university equity
committee. Most of my Public Law students at the time, however, could
not get past the point that the University did not fund the purchase of
computers. They had trouble letting go of the notion that equality means
identical treatment. In contrast, the university easily accepted that what
they were doing was putting me in the same final position as normally
sighted faculty members buying computers for their academic work.
Although I got a contribution to the cost of my computer that others did
not, the end result was that each of us had to pay the basic costs of a regular
computer. This was a simple illustration of the proposition that, in order
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to achieve equality, one sometimes needs to engage in different treatment
of unequals. 17
But the cloud around the silver lining was that the university has no
specified funds for dealing with such expenses. My request had to be
satisfied out of the Law School's regular budget. This was not much of
a practical problem because the amount of money in my case happened
to be relatively small. But the question of principle still remains: why
should a disabled person's immediate colleagues alone have to bear the
costs of having a disabled person on faculty? This point also has echoes
in terms of gender, in relation to the costs of maternity leave replace-
ments. In circumstances where the extra costs are high, there can be a
powerful incentive not to even hire the person who will generate those
extra costs.
In a case involving another faculty at Dalhousie, an issue of this sort
recently went to arbitration in a context where the costs of accommodat-
ing the disability were quite high, and particularly noticeable when they
had to be absorbed by a relatively small faculty. In this case the
accommodation required was a full-time support person; thus the costs of
the accommodation were an entire salary. The arbitrator found that the
failure of the university to fund this salary from outside the faculty
envelope did not amount to discrimination as prohibited by the collective
agreement. Arbitrator Brent found such an "intangible price" of collegial
resentment suffered by the disabled person not to be discriminatory."i
This characterization trivializes the argument relating to the distribu-
tion of costs. Especially in times of shrinking resources, if there are
significant costs of accommodating disability that are narrowly spread,
the resentment directed at the disabled person will likely be very acute.
Until it is recognized that there is a general responsibility to respond to
the need for accommodation, spreading the costs so that the costs of any
individual are small, there will always be pressures on the person seeking
the accommodation to make concessions. The more narrowly we spread
the costs of accommodation, the easier it is to say that accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship.
IV. The Larger Context
The lessons to be learned from my experiences are not specific to me or
to my disability.19 While various disabilities require specifically tailored
17. Andrews, supra, note 8.
18. The Board of Governor of Dalhousie College and University v. Dalhousie Faculty
Association, unreported arbitration award, May 28, 1990 (Brent).
19. At a recent forum on disability at Dalhousie Law School, it was quite striking how similar
were the points made by me and by a dyslexic student, although we had not compared notes
beforehand.
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responses, the general point is.that disabled people need to be respected
for the different ways they do things and are able to do things. The
preoccupation with normalcy needs to be abandoned. There is a wide-
spread assumption that the only thing necessary to alleviate the problems
of the disabled is to remove physical barriers to access. That is part of the
solution, but not the total remedy. The social barriers to access must also
be removed; this requires a broad assumption of social responsibility and
a rethinking of the able bodied view of the world.
This article's reliance on an experiential mode of analysis is a typical
feminist approach.2" This is not merely coincidental. The focus on
experience in either context is to emphasize that one's attitudes reflect
one's perspective and one's place in society. The experiences of those not
part of the dominaiqt culture are, by that fact alone, different.
There are strong parallels between issues related to disability and those
of racism, sexism, and homophobia. In all of these contexts the challenge
is to learn to deal with, understand, and accept differences. In some
contexts, difference needs to be respected in a way that ultimately ignores
it; in other contexts difference needs to be accepted in a way that
ultimately respects it. What too often happens is that difference is
approached in a way that rejects it, in a way that marginalizes the person
who is different. To elaborate, when a disabled person does something in
a different way because of their disability, it is generally not a matter of
conscious choice or preference; it is a matter of necessity. That is the kind
of difference that needs ultimately to be ignored, although it may take a
great deal of conscious effort to ensure that the effects of the difference
are eliminated. At the other end of the spectrum the manifestations of
difference are cultural, choices that are more or less deliberate. That is the
kind of difference that needs not to be ignored, but to be accepted and
respected.
Issues of disability, racism, sexism, and homophobia do not exist in
isolation. We all find aspects of our self-identification in our gender, race,
sexual orientation, and the range of our abilities. The interaction among
these may be quite significant. I have not analysed my experiences related
to my disability as being affected by my gender, because I do not have
enough of a male comparison point to know whether there is a difference.
20. Jill Vickers, "Memoirs of an Otitological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of
Feminist Research", in Miles and Finn (eds.), Feminism in Canada From Pressure to Politics,
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982), 27 at 40; Kathleen Lahey, '". . . Until Women
Themselves Have Told All That They Have To Tell..."' (1985), 23 Osgoode H.L.J. 519.
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However, there is literature which suggests that the social construction of
disability is gendered, that its burden falls more heavily on women who
are disabled than men who are disabled."
It must be recognized that there are important distinctions between
issues of disability and those of racism and sexism. As regards disability,
there is not the same sort of cultural dimension that is part of respecting
racial diversity. The fact that women are at least half the general
population has a significant impact on the nature of the struggle compared
to that of the disabled, who are almost always a small minority in any
community. The numbers point is magnified by the different needs of
persons with different disabilities.
My experience is that, compared to racism and sexism, there is farther
to go in even acknowledging the problem of systemic discrimination
based on disability. 2 I do not think it is an accident that the English
language has developed the words "racism" and "sexism", but has no
comparable word for disability.rs Although the word "ablism" is starting
to make its way into the vocabulary, it is not exactly parallel. For although
the words racism and sexism connote a reference to the victims of the
phenomenon, the word "ablism" does not. To coin my own word, I think
"disabilityism" comes closer to capturing the concept. This point has
more significance than just playing with words. Language is an important
vehicle of social construction, and an expression of cultural identity.
24
... the essential role that language plays in human existence, development,
and dignity. It is through language that we are able to form concepts, to
structure and order the world around us. Language bridges the gap between
isolation and community, allowing humans to delineate the rights and
duties they hold in respect of one another, and thus to live in society? 5
The absence of the word "disabilityism" reflects an able bodied view
of the world.26 It is that able bodied view of the world that continues to
isolate disabled people from the community.
21. Fine & Asch, "Disabled Women: Sexism Without the Pedestal" (1981), 8 Journal of
Sociology and Social Welfare.
22. A similar point is made by David Lepofsky, supra, note 1, at 1.
23. In"Equality in LegalEducation ... SharingaVision.. .; Creating the Pathways..." a report
of the Special Advisory Committee to the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, the term
"disability phobia" is used. For me, that term does not adequately capture the concept. "Phobia"
connotes to me an active and conscious aversion and hatred. While there are certainly elements
of that in reaction to disability, particularly in relation to mental disability, the word "phobia"
fails to take account of the more subtle and subconscious elements of the phenomenon.
24. Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 746.
25. Attorney General of Quebec v Ford et al., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 749.
26. In much the same way as gender biased language reflects a patriarchal world view;
Ang6line Martel and Linda Peterat, "Naming the World: Consciousness in.a Patriarchal
Iceberg" in Vickers (ed.), Taking Sex Into Account: The Policy Consequences of Sexist
Research, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984), at 43.
